Summary. The Bayes factor has been advocated to quantify the weight of forensic evidence; however, in many situations, the likelihood functions required to characterise complex pattern data do not exist and Bayes factors cannot be evaluated directly. Approximate Bayesian Computation allows assigning Bayes factors in these settings. We propose a novel algorithm that relies on the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve to address issues associated with using ABC for model selection. Our algorithm produces more stable results than traditional ones and makes it easier to monitor convergence as the number of simulations increase. We use our method to revisit a previously published fingerprint model.
Introduction
For more than a century, fingerprints have been used with considerable success to identify criminals or verify the identity of individuals. In this paper, we define a fingermark, or mark, as the impression resulting from the inadvertent contact between the finger of an unknown donor and a surface (e.g., at a crime scene). We define a control print, or print, as a finger impression collected under controlled conditions from a known donor (e.g., a suspect). The purpose of forensic fingerprint examination is to identify the donor of a fingermark. Currently, this inference process relies on the visual comparison between the fingermark and control prints from one or more candidate donors who may have been selected through a police investigation or by searching the fingermark in a database of prints from known individuals. Following the examination of fingerprint evidence, it is customary for the examiner to report one of two possible conclusions: an opinion of "identification", implying that the source of the fingermark is the donor of a given control print; or an opinion of "exclusion", implying that the source of the fingermark is not a considered candidate. Alternatively, the examiner may find the examination "inconclusive", indicating that the characteristics of the impressions being compared are not sufficient to reach one of the two possible conclusions (e.g., when the impressions are too small or too degraded).
The categorical conclusion scheme used by fingerprint examiners, and more generally the inference process followed by forensic scientists, have been heavily criticised in the scientific and legal literature (Cole, 2004 (Cole, , 2005 (Cole, , 2009 Kaye, 2003; Koehler, 2005, 2008; Zabell, 2005) . Instead, scholars have proposed to characterise the weight of forensic evidence using the Bayes factor as the key element of the inference process (see Aitken et al. (2010) for a comprehensive discussion).
While many attempts have been made to assign Bayes factors for fingerprint evidence (see Abraham et al. (2013) for a recent review), no algorithm has gained wide acceptance. In particular, while the results obtained with the algorithm proposed by Neumann et al. (2012) were used to support the general admissibility of fingerprint evidence in U.S. courts (State v. Hull, 2008; State v. Dixon, 2011) , commentators argued that the model had two main shortcomings. Some commentators discussed that the algorithm did not result in a formal Bayes factor (Cowell, 2012; Graversen, 2012; Kadane, 2012; Lauritzen, 2012; Stern, 2012) . Others noted that the algorithm relied on an ad-hoc weighting function used to palliate the inability of the authors to assign Bayes factors at 0, that had no other justification than convenience (Balding, 2012; Fotopoulos, 2012; Jandhyala, 2012; Kadane, 2012) .
Fingerprints are usually characterised through certain features of the ridge pattern, such as the general pattern formed by the friction ridge flow and events disturbing the continuity of the ridges. These events, traditionally called minutiae, occur when a ridge ends (ridge ending) or bifurcates (bifurcation). Other types of events exist but are mainly combinations of these two basic types.
When comparing two fingerprints, an examiner first verifies the compatibility of their general patterns and then determines whether the spatial relationships, types, and orientations of the minutiae on both impressions correspond. Mathematically characterising fingerprint patterns results in heterogeneous, high-dimension random vectors: minutia locations and spatial relationships are continuous measurements; minutia types are dis-crete observations; and minutia orientations are circular measurements. In addition, the dimensionality of the problem increases with the number of minutiae observed on a given impression. Therefore, modelling the joint likelihood of the characteristics of multiple features observed on an impression seems to be an unreasonable challenge.
In this paper we revisit the algorithm proposed by Neumann et al. (2012) using an Approximate Bayesian Computation algorithm (ABC). Beyond proposing a rigorous method to quantify the weight of fingerprint evidence, we use properties of the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve to address one of the main weaknesses of ABC methods for model selection (Beaumont, 2010; Didelot et al., 2011; Marin et al., 2012; Robert et al., 2011) . Our novel ROC-based approach addresses the instability created by the use of a heuristic tolerance level to accept/reject simulated samples under the alternative models considered by an ABC model selection algorithm, and circumvents the need for the weighting function used by Neumann et al. (2012) . This paper is structured as follows: section 2 introduces the two alternative propositions addressed by the Bayes factor in the context of fingerprint evidence; section 3 reviews ABC for model selection; a modification of the ABC model selection algorithm is presented in section 4; section 5 describes application of the ROC-ABC algorithm to the fingerprint problem; datasets and algorithm performance are presented and discussed in sections 6, 7, and 8; finally, section 9 explores the scope for future work and discusses the implications of the results for the forensic community.
Bayes factor for fingerprint evidence
Assuming a fingermark recovered in connection with a crime and a suspect, Mr. X., we consider the following two alternative propositions:
H 1 : the fingermark was left by Mr. X.
H 2 : the fingermark was not left by Mr. X., but by another person in a relevant population of potential donors.
To address the so-called prosecution and defence propositions, H 1 and H 2 , we define two corresponding models: M 1 , representing how Mr. X. generates fingermarks, and M 2 , representing how fingermarks are generated by the donors in the population of alternative sources. Let e u denote the set of observations made on the fingermark. We are interested in evaluating the following Bayes factor:
where π(·) is a measure of belief about the model and its parameters (see Robert (2007) , chapter 7, for a formal discussion on Bayesian model selection), and f (·) represents a (marginal) probability density function. Due to the complexity and high dimensionality of the random vectors characterising fingerprint features and their spatial relationships, the likelihood structures required to quantify the Bayes factor in equation (1) are intractable. Several authors have proposed to address this type of model selection problem using Approximate Bayesian Computation (Didelot et al., 2011; Grelaud et al., 2009; Toni and Stumpf, 2010) .
ABC algorithm for model selection
Approximate Bayesian Computation (ABC) has evolved from a sampling method (Pritchard et al., 1999) to a class of model selection algorithms (Didelot et al., 2011; Grelaud et al., 2009; Toni and Stumpf, 2010) . In short, ABC can be used to obtain a sample from an approximate posterior density of a vector of parameters, θ, given an observed data set, D, without direct evaluation of the likelihood function, f (D|θ) (Robert et al., 2011) . This class of algorithms is especially useful in high-dimensional settings where the likelihood function is not available in a usable form.
To sample from an approximate posterior density, vectors of parameter values are sampled from a prior distribution over the parameter space, and then used to generate pseudo-observations (each denoted D * ) from an assumed likelihood function. A vector of parameter values is retained if the distance measured by a kernel function, ∆{·, ·}, between values of a summary statistic, η(·), of D and D * is less than some tolerance, t > 0. In other words, the i th sampled parameter vector, θ (i) , is retained if the corresponding distance score satisfies ∆{η(D), η(D * (i) )} < t.
ABC can also be used for model selection by considering a model index parameter, M, and its prior distribution over model indices (Robert et al., 2011) . The model index determines the prior distribution over the parameter space and the likelihood structure used to sample pseudo-observations. In this setting, the i th sampled model index parameter, M (i) , is retained if the corresponding distance score satisfies ∆{η(D), η(D * (i) )} < t.
ABC can assign the posterior probability for a model, given the observed data, as a function of the ratio of the number of times that model index has been retained over the total number of times any model was retained (Didelot et al., 2011; Grelaud et al., 2009; Robert et al., 2011; Toni and Stumpf, 2010) ; however, other methods have been proposed (Beaumont et al., 2002; Pudlo et al., 2016) .
When comparing two models, it is straightforward to evaluate the ABC Bayes factor quantifying the support of the data to one or the other model using the prior odds and approximated posterior odds for the two considered models. Mathematically, the ABC posterior odds for the comparison between two models is given by
where I(·) is the indicator function and the subscript t in π t indicates that this measure is a function of the choice of the tolerance level. The ABC Bayes Factor, BF abc , can then be assigned using the ABC approximation of the posterior odds, divided by the prior odds
The original ABC algorithm for comparing two models is summarised in algorithm 1 (Marin and Robert, 2014; Didelot et al., 2011; Grelaud et al., 2009; Toni and Stumpf, 2010) . Note that two versions of the ABC algorithm for model selection can be considered. In the version presented here, N represents the total number of simulations. Another version of the algorithm uses N as the total number of accepted model indices. The latter version of the algorithm is much more computationally intensive than the c 2 0 1 8 S D S U former, however, it enables the user to control the number of model indices and samples of parameter vectors that will be accepted by the algorithm.
Algorithm 1: ABC model selection algorithm (Marin and Robert, 2014) Data: Observed data, D.
Result: ABC Bayes factor, BF abc . for i = 1 to N do Sample a model index M (i) from the model prior, π(M = m), where m = 1, 2; Sample a vector of parameters, θ (i) , from the prior density, π(θ|M
Calculate the ratio of counts as defined in equation (2); Assign BF abc as in equation (3); Robert et al. (2011) show that by assuming equal priors on the model indices,
where BF η (D) denotes a Bayes factor depending only on the summary statistic of the data. Robert et al. (2011) further showed that the relationship between BF (D) and BF η (D), when η(·) is a sufficient statistic under both model 1 and 2, is given by
where g 1 (·) and g 2 (·) are real-valued functions that do not depend on the parameters of M 1 and M 2 . The ratio
is unknown in the majority of cases where ABC is used. Thus, it is only possible to guarantee the convergence of the ABC Bayes factor to the Bayes factor in a very limited number of cases (Robert et al., 2011) . Robert et al. (2011) and Didelot et al. (2011) show that while η(·) may be sufficient for f (D|θ 1 ) and f (D|θ 2 ), it is not necessarily sufficient to compare them. However, Didelot et al. (2011) argued that when the models being compared by the Bayes factor are nested within some overall model, a statistic that is sufficient for the overall model may be sufficient across all nested models. The issue of sufficient statistics in the context of fingerprints will be addressed in a later section.
Aside from the impact of the choice of summary statistic on the convergence of the ABC Bayes factor to the Bayes factor, the effect of the tolerance level on performances of ABC algorithms has been widely discussed since the inception of ABC methods (Beaumont et al., 2002) . While several methods have been proposed to address this issue (see Beaumont (2010) and Marin et al. (2012) for reviews), it remains one of the major weaknesses of ABC methods. In summary, the choice of t is critical because if t is too large the approximation becomes invalid, but if t is too small the the rate of acceptance is too small to produce a stable result (Didelot et al., 2011; Robert et al., 2011) .
Ideally, we want to assign Bayes factors that are not dependent on a tolerance level (or on a weighting function ). We propose a modification to c 2 0 1 8 S D S U the ABC algorithm that utilises a relationship between the ABC Bayes factor and the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve and enables us to bypass the need to define a tolerance level in the ABC model selection algorithm, or at the very least to control rigorously its impact on the convergence of the ABC Bayes factor to the Bayes factor.
ROC-ABC algorithm for model selection
ROC curves are traditionally used to measure the performance of a binary classifier as the decision threshold, t, is varied across the domain of (dis)similarity scores, ∆{·, ·}, that can be returned by the classifier (Pepe, 2003) . ROC curves are obtained by plotting the rate of correct decisions in favour of the first model against the rate of incorrect decisions (false positives) in favour of the first model (i.e. when the second model is true) for all possible values of the decision threshold. Defining F (·) and G(·) as the cumulative distribution functions of scores under models 1 and 2, respectively, the general form of the ROC is given by (Pepe, 2003) 
where p denotes the rate of false positives in favour of the first model and G −1 (·) denotes the quantile function (van der Vaart, 1998) for scores under the second model. Assuming equal priors for the model indices, we can show that the ABC Bayes factor is a function of the ROC curve constructed on the set of ∆{η(D), ·} from model 1 and the set of ∆{η(D), ·} from model 2:
= lim
Equalities (7) and (8) come from Robert et al. (2011) ; the equality between (8) and (9) is a result of the definition of the empirical distribution function (Wasserman, 2013) ; and, the approximate equality between (9) and (10) results from the convergence of the empirical distribution function to the true distribution function as K and L get arbitrarily large, and from the assumption that K and L grow at the same rate given that π(M = 2) = π(M = 1).
The relationship expressed between equations (7) and (11) shows that the ABC Bayes factor for two alternative models of interest can be assigned using the ratio between ROC(p) and p as the rate of false positives in favour of model 1 approaches 0. This notable result allows us to express the convergence of the ABC Bayes factor as a function of the rate of false positives in favour of model 1. As we will see below, this has significant practical implications when it comes to estimating the ABC Bayes factor.
Empirical ROC
We can leverage the relationship between equations (7) and (11) to assign an ABC Bayes factor in several ways. Our first method is purely data driven and uses the following approximation of the ratio in equation (11):
We see that by defining t such that
is constant for any N , and by increasing the number of simulations, the ratio in the denominator of equation (12) will be driven to 0; hence, approximating the limit as p → 0 + in equation (11). This approach has several major advantages as compared to current practice: (a) t is chosen only as a function of the distance scores between the value of the summary statistic of the observed data and the value of the summary statistic of the data generated under model 2 (versus all distance scores in other implementations of the ABC algorithm). (b) t is chosen such that the number of accepted distance scores under model 2 is fixed (versus a fixed value of t arbitrarily close to 0, or a varying value of t based on a fixed quantile of the empirical distribution of the distance scores).
For a given set of observed data, all current implementations of the ABC algorithm result in unpredictable variations of both the numerator and the denominator of the ratio in equation (7) as N increases, which makes its convergence difficult to monitor. By fixing the rate of convergence of the denominator in equation (7), our approach has the potential to better plan computing resources and monitor convergence.
The non-central dual beta ROC model
Our second approach extends further the relationship between the ABC Bayes factor and the ROC curve by noting that (Pepe, 2003) :
= lim p→0 + d dp
where f (·) and g(·) denote the probability density functions of distance scores under models 1 and 2, respectively. Assigning an ABC Bayes factor using equation (15) requires evaluation of the first derivative of ROC(p), as p → 0 + , or the ratio of densities,
Following Metz et al. (1998) , Mossman and Peng (2016) , and Chen and Hu (2016), we choose to fit a semi-parametric model to the empirical ROC curve obtained from the finite number of ∆{η(D), ·} generated by the algorithm. As noted by these authors, fitting a model to each of the score distributions makes the assumption that the scores follow this particular model. Instead, fitting a model directly to the ROC curve relies on the weaker assumption that there exists a monotonic transformation of the observed scores that results in scores whose distributions can be described by a simple model. Since the ROC curve is invariant to monotonic increasing transformations of the scores (Pepe, 2003; Metz et al., 1998; Mossman and Peng, 2016; Chen and Hu, 2016) , the simple model can be used to represent the ROC curve without knowledge of the underlying score distributions.
The common binormal representation of the ROC was considered (Pepe, 2003) , however it can easily be shown that the limit of the binormal model as p → 0 + is either taking a value of 0, 1 or ∞. Instead we use a model based on two non-central beta distributions (Johnson et al., 1995) . Placing a restriction on the first shape parameter of each distribution (α F = α G = 1) results in the following semi-parametric model for the ROC curve
where F (·) and G(·) are non-central beta distribution functions with parameters α F , β F , λ F , and α G , β G , λ G corresponding to F and G respectively. The restriction on the first shape parameter of the densities guarantees that their ratio, as p → 0 + , produces a stable result for all parameter values within the support:
Fitting the semi-parametric model requires the use of numerical optimisation techniques to estimate the parameter values. We use a two step fitting procedure: (a) Obtain an initial set of parameter estimates for β F , λ F , β G , λ G using a Maximum Likelihood Estimation approach for fitting a dual beta ROC model to continuous data (Metz et al., 1998; Mossman and Peng, 2016; Chen and Hu, 2016) . (b) Refine these estimates using an objective function to minimise the L 2 norm between the semi-parametric model and the empirical ROC.
The first step of our procedure enables us to include information on which model produced each distance score ∆{η(D), η(D * (i) )}. However, during our implementation we found that the fit of the semi-parametric model to the empirical ROC curve could be improved from this method. Meanwhile, the L 2 norm objective function alone did not allow us to fit an adequate model when the score distributions overlapped heavily. Combining both processes gave the best results.
Once estimates for β F , λ F , β G , and λ G are obtained, it is trivial to use equation (17) to assign the ROC-ABC Bayes factor. In practice, when a limited number of distance scores near 0 are observed, the quality of the fit of the ROC model near 0 can produce Bayes factors of meaningless magnitude (e.g., larger than 10 100 or smaller than 10 −100 ); these Bayes factors would vary wildly from one computation to another using the same observed data. We found that bounding the rate of false positives, p, to some low value, such as 10 −5 , before evaluating equation (16) produced more robust ABC Bayes factors.
Application of ROC-ABC to fingerprint evidence
The algorithm proposed by Neumann et al. (2012) attempts to address the issue of intractable likelihoods for fingerprint evidence by using a kernel function that calculates a "score" representing the "level of dissimilarity" between pairs of minutiae configurations. To assign a Bayes factor to an observed fingermark, Neumann et al.'s 2012 algorithm considers two sets of scores. The first set contains scores measuring the level of dissimilarity between the observed fingermark and pseudo-fingermarks generated by Mr. X. The second set contains scores measuring the dissimilarity between the observed fingermark and pseudo-fingermarks originating from a sample of individuals from a population of potential alternative sources. The general idea behind Neumann et al. (2012) 's model is that, if H 1 is true, Mr. X. would generate many more pseudo-fingermarks that are similar to the observed fingermark than the individuals in the population of alternative sources.
ABC for model selection possesses some obvious similarities with the algorithm proposed by Neumann et al. (2012) . Both algorithms require generating pseudo-observations from models and comparing the pseudo-observations to observed data; both algorithms involve "counting" the number of pseudo-observations that are "very similar" to the observed data; and both algorithms are intended to quantify the weight of evidence supporting one of two models. Indeed, if we define (a) D using the observed fingermark, e u ; (b) models 1 and 2 in equations (2) and (3) as the prosecution model and the defence model, respectively; (c) generative models corresponding to M 1 and M 2 ; (d) a distance metric, ∆{·, ·}, to compare pairs of summary statistics representing finger impressions; (e) and identify a sufficient summary statistic, η(·), across models in the context of fingerprints,
we obtain an ROC-ABC algorithm to assign a Bayes factor for fingerprint evidence. This algorithm addresses both major criticisms of Neumann et al. (2012) : it allows capturing the user's beliefs on the parameters under each model through the generative models associated with M 1 and M 2 ; it also eliminates the need for a weighting function. The ROC-ABC algorithm for fingerprint evidence is summarised in algorithm 2. It will converge to the Bayes factor under the same conditions as discussed in section 3 (i.e. sufficient statistic across all models, optimal distance metric, infinite/large number of Generate a pseudo-fingermark, e * (i) u , by distorting the selected print using the sampled distortion parameters;
Compute ∆{η(e u ), η(e * (i) u )}; Assign the ROC-ABC Bayes factor using methods from section 4.1 or 4.2.
Generation of pseudo-fingermark data
Implementation of the ROC-ABC algorithm for fingerprint evidence requires a model from which pseudo-fingermarks can be generated. We utilise the same fingerprint distortion model as Neumann et al. (2012) to generate pseudo-fingermarks from any given control print. This model mimics the way fingerprint features are displaced as the skin on the tip of a finger is distorted when pressed against a flat surface. The parameter space of the model represents a wide variety of distortion directions and pressures. The model allows many different distortions to be produced from a single finger. Our distortion model assumes that fingers distort in the same way, independently of factors related to the donor (e.g., age, weight, profession) and to the finger number (e.g., right vs. left hand, thumb vs. index finger). The model obviously does not cover all possible distortion and pressure conditions, and donor related factors; however, it is currently the only option to obtain a large number of pseudo-fingermarks from any given individual.
5.1.1. Generation of pseudo-fingermarks under the prosecution model When comparing fingerprints, an examiner first detects k features of interest on the fingermark. Second, the examiner compares it to the 10 control prints from the donor considered by the prosecution proposition and selects the finger appearing to be the most likely source of the mark. Finally, the examiner attempts to identify the most similar k corresponding features out of the n features present on the control print from the selected finger. Note that, once selected, the sets of features on the fingermark and the control print remain fixed for the duration of the experiment, and that the selection process results in a unique bijective pairing between the two sets of k features. Our algorithm assumes that this selection and pairing process has been done before generating pseudofingermarks under M 1 . When M 1 is selected by the algorithm, a pseudo-fingermark is generated from the k features selected on the control print using the distortion model. By construction, the features on this pseudo-fingermark have the same pairing with the c 2 0 1 8 S D S U features of the fingermark as the ones on the control print. The uncertainty on the type of the feature was modelled as described in Neumann et al. (2015) . By repeating this process each time M 1 is selected, we can obtain a set of pseudo-fingermarks from the k features selected on the control print of Mr. X.
Generation of pseudo-fingermarks under the defence model
The defence proposition defined in section 2 considers that, if the fingermark was not left by Mr. X, it must have been left by another person in a relevant population of alternative sources. Assuming that fingerprint patterns result from a completely random process during the development of the fetus, we can generate data under M 2 , first, by randomly selecting an individual from any representative sample of donors from the human population, and secondly, by generating a pseudo-fingermark from this individual's k minutiae configuration that is most similar to the k minutiae observed on the fingermark. As in the previous section, the features of this pseudo-fingermark have a unique bijective pairing with the features on the fingermark by construction. This process is repeated each time M 2 is selected to obtain a random set of pseudo-fingermarks from the population of potential donors considered by M 2 . Since it would be unrealistic to repeat manually the selection of the most similar k minutiae for each individual in a large sample, we use a commercially available automated fingerprint matching system to perform this task.
Summary statistic
Configurations of minutiae can be described numerically in the form of heterogeneous multi-dimensional random vectors containing the measurements summarised in table 1. Minutiae locations and orientations are taken with respect to a coordinate system based on the frame of the impression's picture. Different framings of the same impression result in different measurements for the same set of features. For this reason, the original measurements need to be summarised in a way that is rotation and translation invariant. Several invariant measurements capturing the spatial relationships between the minutiae in a configuration can be calculated, such as the distance of each minutiae from the centroid of the configuration (average of Cartesian coordinates of the minutiae in the configuration), and the distances between every pair of minutiae in the configuration (figures 1 (b) and (c)). A similar approach can be used to define invariant summaries of the direction of each feature by using fixed-length segments to represent minutiae directions and by taking the distances between the ends of these segments for every pair of minutiae in the configuration ( figure 1 (d) ). We also choose to represent minutiae directions as a function of the axes going from the centroid through the location of each minutia (angles are measured counterclockwise) (figure 1 (e)). Feature types can be directly compared between configurations without the need to summarise since types are rotation and translation invariant. All of these measurements can be brought together to create a summary statistic of the original representation. Given the heterogeneity and dimension of the measurements, it is unlikely that a sufficient summary statistic exists for fingerprint data. Here we adopt the approach sketched in Pudlo et al. (2016) which consists in pooling together as many individual summary statistics as possible in order to minimise the loss of information with respect to the original data. That said, given that the model used to generate pseudo-fingermarks under M 2 is an extension of the model used under M 1 , as our pooled summary statistic tends to sufficiency we can assume that it will be sufficient to compare between M 1 and M 2 (Didelot et al., 2011) . The individual summary statistics described above were designed to illustrate the concept of the ROC-ABC in the concept of fingerprints and can certainly be improved through further investigation.
Distance metric
The ABC Bayes factor for fingerprint evidence depends on a distance metric, ∆{·, ·}, between two summarised configurations of minutiae. Configurations that are "similar" should have a distance score near 0. This distance score should increase as a function of the level of dissimilarity between two configurations.
We designed a distance metric, ∆{·, ·}, that is a linear combination of several metrics, denoted by ∆ 1 {·, ·}, ∆ 2 {·, ·}, ∆ 3 {·, ·}, ∆ 4 {·, ·}, and ∆ 5 {·, ·}, corresponding to the different summary statistics described above and aimed at capturing differences in spatial c 2 0 1 8 S D S U relationships, directions, and types of the features:
where c i , for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, are real-valued constants. The components of the metric are described below. We remind the reader that by construction (see section 5.1) the i th measurement in e u is uniquely paired with the i th measurement in e * u .
Components of the distance metric
The first component, ∆ 1 {·, ·}, captures the differences in cross-distances between the locations of the minutiae in a pair of configurations. Denoting the i th cross-distance from e u by d i , and the i th cross-distance from e * u by d * i , the first component of the distance metric is given by
. The second component, ∆ 2 {·, ·}, captures the difference in the spatial spread of the features. Denoting the distance of the i th minutiae from the centroid of the configuration from e u by d i , and the same from e * u by d * i , this component is given by
. The third component, ∆ 3 {·, ·}, takes the same form as ∆ 1 {·, ·}, but instead uses d i and d * i as the i th cross-distance between location markers for feature directions (as illustrated in figure 1  (d) ) on e u and e * u respectively. This component captures differences in directions of the features. The fourth component, ∆ 4 {·, ·}, captures the difference in direction between the paired features for two configurations. Denoting the angle (measured in degrees) depicted in figure 1 (e) for the i th minutiae of e u by θ i , and the same from e * u by θ * i , the fourth component is given by
Finally, denoting the type of the i th minutiae from e u by τ i , and the same from e * u by τ * i , the fifth component is given by
Optimisation of the distance metric
Values for all c i in equation (18) can be obtained by maximising the separation between the distribution of ∆{·, ·}'s from minutiae configurations generated by the same donor, and the distribution of ∆{·, ·}'s from minutiae configurations generated by different donors. To obtain the results presented later in this paper, we used numerical optimisation to maximise the average area under 450 ROC curves obtained from configurations with 5, 8, 12, 17, and 23 minutiae. Each ROC curve was based on 50,000 distance scores as calculated in equation 18 and obtained by comparing k minutiae on a fingermark to pseudo-fingermarks resulting from the distortion of the true source of the fingermark (section 5.1.1) and from the distortion of other fingers (section 5.1.2).
c 2 0 1 8 S D S U
Our results indicated that the second and fifth components of our metric did not help discriminate between same-source and different-sources distance scores, and were assigned c 2 = c 5 = 0. Our results also indicated that component 3 was the most useful to maximise the average area under the ROC curve (c 3 = 6.5), followed by component 1 (c 1 = 1) and by component 4 (c 4 = 0.1). Other optimisation procedures or objective functions may be considered.
Number of simulations
Given the number of minutiae configurations used to test the performance of the ROC-ABC Bayes factor in the context of fingerprint examination, we limited the total number of pseudo-fingermarks generated for each test configuration to 500,000 (approximately 250,000 under each model). Assuming that we are interested in assigning the ROC-ABC Bayes factor for a specific fingermark, a much larger number of pseudo-fingermarks can be generated.
Datasets
The algorithm has been developed, optimised, and tested using several datasets. Each dataset comprises fingermarks or control prints captured digitally at 1:1 magnification and a resolution of 500 pixels per inch. All features were either labelled manually by an experienced fingerprint examiner or determined automatically by the encoding algorithm of the automated fingerprint matching system used in this study. The following features were extracted from every fingerprint used in the study:
(a) the finger of origin of the impression, from 1 -right thumb -to 10 -left little finger (for control prints only); (b) the Cartesian coordinates of each minutia in pixels, using the bottom left of the image as the origin; (c) the direction of each minutia in radians, using the bottom left of the image as the origin and measuring counterclockwise; (d) the type of each minutia: ridge ending, bifurcation or unknown; (e) the Cartesian coordinates of the centre of the impression (for control prints only).
The datasets used in this study are described below.
Dataset A: relevant population of potential donors
A dataset of control prints taken under controlled conditions from more than 400,000 individuals (only identified through randomly assigned ID numbers) was used as a sample of a population of potential sources. The size of the dataset was not driven by scientific considerations, but corresponds to the number of control prints that the authors managed to gather for research purposes. Locations, directions, and types of fingerprint features were extracted automatically. This dataset was used to generate pseudo-fingermarks under the defence model (see section 5.1.2) and to generate special test cases under the prosecution model (see below). 6.2. Dataset B: True source dataset A dataset of 207 pairs of fingermark and control print were obtained from casework archives. While the sources of the fingermarks are unknown, a trained fingerprint examiner deemed that, within each pair, the fingermark and control print originate from the same finger. Since the fingermarks originate from casework, they were developed on multiple surfaces using different physicochemical methods and represent a range of fingermarks that can be observed in casework. The fingerprint features on each pair of impressions were manually annotated by the fingerprint examiner. Corresponding features between paired impressions were manually designated by the fingerprint examiner. Test configurations, ranging from 3 to 25 minutiae, were sampled from the fingermarks (one configuration of each size per fingermark). For each test configuration, the corresponding minutiae on the control print were also selected, thus providing pairs of "matching" configurations truly originating from the same source (or assumed to be).
The fingermarks described here were used as e u when generating the results presented below. The corresponding control prints were used as control prints from Mr. X to test the ROC-ABC algorithm when the prosecution proposition, H 1 , is true.
6.3. Dataset C: "Close non-matching" source dataset The 4067 test configurations generated from the 207 fingermarks from dataset B were automatically compared against the control prints from all individuals in the sample from the population in dataset A. The matching algorithm was set up to select the control configuration that appeared most similar to each test configuration.
These pairs of configurations were used to test the ROC-ABC algorithm when the defence proposition, H 2 , is true and Mr. X is not the true source of the fingermark, but possesses a very similar configuration of minutiae. This is equivalent to testing the algorithm under the "worst possible case" scenario, which may correspond to the situation where Mr. X has been brought to the attention of the prosecution as a result of a database search.
Dataset D: "Random" source dataset
The experiment performed to construct dataset C was repeated. However, in this case, the matching algorithm was set up to return random configurations from any of the control prints, regardless of their levels of similarity to the test configurations.
These pairs of configurations were used to test the ROC-ABC algorithm when the defence proposition, H 2 , is true and Mr. X is not the true source of the fingermark, and he has not been selected based on the characteristics of his fingerprints. This is c 2 0 1 8 S D S U equivalent to testing the algorithm in situations where Mr. X has been brought to the attention of the prosecution as the result of evidence unrelated to fingerprint.
Results
Three experiments were performed using 4067 test configurations ranging from 3 to 25 minutiae and sampled from 207 fingermarks. For each test configuration, we consider in turn that Mr. X is either the true source of the test configuration (dataset B), a donor selected based on the similarity of his fingerprints to the test configuration (dataset C), or a donor randomly selected in a population of donors (dataset D). In these experiments, the control configurations in datasets B to D were used to resample pseudo-fingermarks using M 1 , and dataset A was used to resample pseudo-fingermarks using M 2 . All results are presented in figures 2 to 7; note that the vertical axis in these figures has been truncated to focus on the mass of the distributions and that some extreme outliers may not be represented.
The result of the first experiment (H 1 is true and each mark configuration is compared to a control print from the correct source) are presented in figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 presents the ROC-ABC Bayes factor assigned using the empirical ROC method discussed in section 4.1 and algorithm 3 presents the ROC-ABC Bayes factor assigned using the non-central dual beta ROC model described in section 4.2. Both figures show a similar behaviour of the ROC-ABC Bayes factor where the magnitude of the ROC-ABC Bayes factor increases as the number of minutiae increases. In both cases, ROC-ABC Bayes factors appear bounded: those assigned using the empirical ROC are bounded by the fixed ratio in the denominator of equation 12, which was set to 1 in 500,000; those assigned using the non-central dual beta ROC model are bounded by the lowest value that p is authorised to take in equation 16, which was set to 10 −5 . Bayes factors erroneously supporting H 2 are noted in both series of results for smaller configurations of minutiae (3 to 7 minutiae), which is not surprising as these configurations contain less discriminative information and are more likely to be observed in fingers from different individuals. Nevertheless, we note that only a handful of ROC-ABC Bayes factors support the wrong proposition for larger configurations. These cases deserve further investigation; at this time, we believe that they are related to configurations displaying unusual distortion that cannot be handled by the current generation of the distortion algorithm. The use of improved summary statistic, distance metric, and distortion algorithm may be able to minimise further the number of cases where the Bayes factor erroneously supports H 2 . Finally, we observe that the range of values taken by the ROC-ABC Bayes factor for different configuration sizes overlap which supports the observations made by Neumann et al. (2012) that there is no scientific justification for the use of a fixed number of minutiae as a decision point to distinguish between H 1 and H 2 , and that the evidential value of each configuration needs to be quantified based on its own characteristics. The results of the second experiment (H 2 is true and each mark configuration is compared to a control print with high level of similarity from a different source) are presented in figures 4 and 5. In both cases, a large proportion of the ROC-ABC Bayes factors erroneously support the hypothesis of common source, H 1 , although the algorithm using the empirical ROC appears to perform significantly better. The high rate of misleading evidence is not a surprise for low numbers of minutiae since it is not difficult to find multiple similar configurations on different fingers in large a dataset. The high rate of misleading evidence is more surprising for larger configurations. Larger values of the ROC-ABC Bayes factor when the fingermark and the control print do not originate from the same source occur when the metric used by the algorithm considers that the pseudo-fingermarks generated using M 1 are more similar to the observed fingermark than they really are. As mentioned before, improvement of the summary statistic and the distance metric should significantly reduce the rate of misleading evidence in favour of H 1 . In practice, we believe that examiners comparing close non-matching finger impressions would be able to exclude that they originate from a common source by visual inspection using friction ridge characteristics that are not taken into account by our metric.
The results of the third experiment (H 2 is true and each mark configuration is compared to a randomly selected control print from a different source) are presented in figures 6 and 7. In both cases the majority of observations correctly support the hypothesis of different sources, H 2 . As in the second experiment, the algorithm using the empirical ROC curve significantly outperforms the one based on the non-central dual beta model of the ROC curve. This indicates that the semi-parametric modelling of the ROC curve needs to be improved by explicitly transforming the distributions of the observed scores into ones whose shapes are more appropriate for beta models, and by refining the estimation process of the model's parameters.
Discussion
The contribution of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we proposed an improvement to the standard ABC algorithm. In our approach, based on properties of the ROC curve, the convergence of the algorithm becomes a function of the rate of false positives in favour of the model considered in the numerator of the Bayes factor. For a given set of observed data, most current implementations of the ABC algorithm will result in unpredictable variations of both the numerator and the denominator of the ABC Bayes factor as the number of simulations, N , increases, which makes the convergence of the algorithm difficult to monitor. In our approach, the tolerance level, t, is chosen such that the number of accepted samples under the model considered in the denominator of the Bayes factor is fixed for all N . Hence, as N increases, the approximation of the limit as the rate of false positives goes to 0 improves. Our approach has the potential to better plan computing resources and monitor convergence.
To implement this approach in practice, we have proposed two methods to directly assign ROC-ABC Bayes factors. Our results show significant differences in performance between the empirical ROC and the dual beta ROC method. The empirical model appears to produce more stable and meaningful results (i.e., ABC Bayes factors with c 2 0 1 8 S D S U reasonable magnitude). As we increase the number of simulations, the empirical model naturally approximates the limit p → 0 + in equation (11). The non-central dual beta ROC model has the potential to explore the limit when p → 0 + with a smaller sample size. In practice, we observed that the values obtained using equation (17) for multiple runs of the ROC-ABC algorithm for a given set of observed data differ greatly from one another (many orders of magnitude on the log 10 scale). It appears that equation (17) is very sensitive to small changes in the values of the estimates of the model's parameters. Instead, we tried to fix p = 10 −5 in equation (16) to obtain more robust values and generate the data in figures 3, 5, and 7. Our results show that in many cases our algorithm does not support the correct model; this may be due to our modelling of the ROC curve in the neighbourhood of 0 not being an accurate representation of the data. Once again, this shows that the non-central dual beta ROC model is very sensitive to small changes in the estimates of its parameters. Improvements can be made to the fitting procedure for the non-central dual beta ROC model, such as an explicit monotonic increasing transformation of the distance scores to initiate the numerical optimisation procedure with distributions that are closer to the assumed model; alternatively, other models whose limits at 0 exist can be investigated. Secondly, we have proposed a method to quantify the weight of fingerprint evidence using the formal statistical framework provided by ABC. The ROC-ABC algorithm serves to address several criticisms of the Neumann et al. (2012) model by capturing the user's belief about the parameters of the two competing models and by providing an alternative to the weighting function that they proposed.
Overall, our results are consistent with the results presented by Neumann et al. (2012) and support the idea that fingerprints can be used to reliably detect the authors of crimes:
(a) The probability of misleading evidence in favour of the defence decreases dramatically as the number of minutiae increases. (b) The probability of misleading evidence in favour of the prosecutor is very low for configurations greater than 7 minutiae, when the donor has been randomly selected. As expected, this probability is higher when the donor has been selected based on the similarity of its fingerprints with the fingermark. Improvements in the summary statistic used to describe fingerprint patterns and in the metric used to compare them, together with the ability of fingerprint examiners to account for more discriminative information than our model, will certainly reduce the rate of misleading evidence in favour of the prosecutor in an operational implementation of the model. (c) The overlap between the ranges of values of the ROC-ABC Bayes factor across different numbers of minutiae confirms that the use of the number of corresponding minutiae is only one of the criteria for inferring the identity of the source, and that the contribution of additional information regarding fingerprint pattern needs to be taken into account when determining the donor of a fingermark.
We have not fully addressed the necessary sufficiency of the summary statistic that is required for the convergence of the ABC Bayes factor to the Bayes factor. This convergence is extremely important in the forensic context where fact-finders are as c 2 0 1 8 S D S U equally interested in the proposition supported by the Bayes factor as in the magnitude of this support. The measurements we use are related only to minutiae and thus, there is a vast amount of information that is lost. This information could certainly be used to reduce the rates of misleading evidence in favour of the prosecution or the defence shown in our results. The sufficiency of the summary statistic in our work may be addressed in the future by pooling many more summary statistics of the observed fingerprint patterns and by exploring how to best combine them as in Pudlo et al. (2016) . Similarly, we do not claim that the distance metric that was used in this paper is optimal. We were unable to use the metric from our commercial matching system with pseudo-fingermarks generated from the fingerprints of the individuals considered under H 1 . Therefore, we had to design a fit-for-purpose metric to obtain scores using the same metric under both models. An operational implementation of the proposed model by a manufacturer of commercial fingerprint systems would solve this issue. In the future, we plan to incorporate information related to the quality of the fingerprint images in the model.
While the summary statistic and the metric used to generate the results presented in this paper can be improved upon, they are adequate to show the potential of the concept of the ROC-ABC algorithm. Operational implementation of the method would require further studies of the repeatability of the values obtained by the algorithm as a function of different samples (and different sample sizes) of the population of potential donors considered by H 2 .
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a method to quantify the weight of fingerprint evidence by implementing an Approximate Bayesian Computation algorithm. We use the properties of the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve to address the issue of choosing a suitable tolerance level when assigning ABC Bayes factors. Our modification allows for a natural convergence of the algorithm as the number of simulations increases, and for monitoring this convergence as a function of the sole rate of false positives in favour of the model considered in the numerator of the Bayes factor.
The use of the ROC-ABC algorithm addresses several criticisms of the model proposed by Neumann et al. (2012) and frames the quantification of the weight of fingerprint evidence within a formal Bayesian framework.
The results presented here show that our method is promising, with low rates of misleading evidence, and has the potential to be applied to many other complex, highdimension evidence forms such as shoe prints, questioned documents, firearms, and traces characterised by analytical chemistry.
Ultimately, the widespread use of statistical approaches to quantify the weight of forensic evidence to replace the existing inference paradigm can only be enabled by technology providers offering commercial products to the forensic community. Our method leverages currently available technology that was designed to search forensic traces into large databases and retrieve the most likely candidates. For mainstream evidence types such as fingerprints, firearms, and shoe impressions, our algorithm can readily be implemented, validated, and integrated in current commercial offerings. 
